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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
BRET THOMAS CRIDDLE, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Priority No. 2 
Case No. 950687-CA 
NATURE OF APPEAL AND JURISDICTIONAL BASIS 
Defendant appeals his conviction for second-degree felony theft. Because 
the conviction is for a second-degree felony, this Court has jurisdiction. Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1995). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did the State present in its case-in-chief some evidence from which a 
reasonable jury could find the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, 
thus justifying the trial court's denial of the motion to dismiss? A trial court's 
ruling on a motion to dismiss is a question of law. State v. Taylor, 884 P.2d 
1293, 1296 (Utah App. 1994). 
2. Due to the evidence defendant presented in his case-in-chief after the 
trial court denied his motion to dismiss, was any error in the court's decision 
harmless because the jury could have found guilt based on defendant's evidence? 
The trial court did not consider this issue; therefore, there is no standard of 
review. 
3. Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel should defendant be 
precluded from relitigating his competency to stand trial since this Court 
examined this issue in defendant's appeal from a recent but different conviction. 
State v. Criddle, Case No. 950639-CA, September 6, 1996 (memorandum 
decision) ("Criddle I")? Collateral estoppel precludes relitigation if (1) the issue 
being challenged is identical to that decided in the previous case; (2) in the prior 
case, the issue was decided on the merits; (3) the party against whom estoppel is 
raised was a party in the prior case; and (4) the issue was competently, fully, and 
fairly litigated in the prior case. Sevy v. Security Title Co., 902 P.2d 629, 632 
(Utah 1995); see also Glick v. Holden, 889 P.2d 1389, 1391 (Utah App. 1995). 
Whether these factors are met is a question of law. Malone v. Parker, 826 P.2d 
132, 133 (Utah 1992). 
4. Did the trial court err when it failed to hold a restitution hearing 
despite defendant's challenge to the amount ordered? The State concedes that 
2 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20l(4)(e) (Supp. 1996) obligated the trial court to hold 
the requested hearing. Therefore, the case should be remanded for this limited 
purpose. 
RELEVANT PROVISIONS 
Provisions relevant to this appeal are referred to in the text. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Procedural History 
On April 18, 1995, a jury convicted defendant of theft, a second-degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1995) (R. 178). After a 90-
day diagnostic evaluation and pre-sentence investigation, the trial court sentenced 
defendant to prison for an indeterminate term of one-to-fifteen years (R. 197). 
The court also ordered him to pay restitution in the sum of $4745 for damage to 
the trailer, its contents, and a carport (id.). 
Statement of Facts 
THE STATE'S CASE 
At 3:30 p.m. on April 23, 1994, South 67 Condominiums' assistant 
manager Matthew Schultz saw Johnathan Remington backing up his Toyota 4 x 4 
pickup to a trailer at the condo parking lot (R. 331). Defendant was standing 
between the truck and trailer while Remington was backing the truck up to within 
3 
three feet of the trailer (R. 332). Remington got out of the truck and briefly 
came over to talk with Mr. Schultz while defendant stayed where he was (id.). 
Neither defendant nor Remington were occupants of South 67 nor had Mr. 
Schultz previously seen either of them there (id.). 
Around 6:00 that evening, Arthur Lindquist, the condo manager, saw that 
the carport was damaged and the trailer, which belonged to Lester Gayheart, was 
gone (R. 341). Mr. Gayheart had not given anyone permission to move the 
trailer (R. 324). 
Murray police found the 20-feet long Wells Cargo trailer approximately a 
mile from the condominium and Mr. Gayheart picked it up the next day (R. 326-
27). The trailer damage amounted to $1000 and several of the contents were 
destroyed (R. 326). Mr. Gayheart estimated their value between $1500 and 
$2000 (id.). The damage to the condominium carport cost $545 to repair (R. 
342). 
THE DEFENDANT'S EVIDENCE 
Defendant testified on his behalf and admitted he was standing between 
Remington's truck and the trailer (R. 371). Until later that night, however, when 
Remington started boasting about stealing the trailer, defendant stated he believed 
Remington owned it (R. 374). 
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On direct, defendant also explained that he and Remington had been 
involved in another trailer theft the day before the Gayheart theft (R. 378-81) See 
Criddle 1 (attached as Addendum).1 According to defendant, Remington had 
stayed with him two nights before, on April 21-22 (R. 375). On the morning of 
the 22nd, Remington started questioning defendant about a trailer in the parking 
lot of his apartment complex that looked abandoned (id.). While leaving the 
complex, purportedly to go drinking at a bar that afternoon, Remington, who was 
driving his truck, backed up to the trailer and chained it to his bumper (R. 378). 
Defendant claimed he did not assist Remington take the trailer but admitted that 
he was in the truck and did not leave (id; see also Criddle 1, addendum.). Only a 
few days later, the police arrested defendant and Remington (R. 380). Defendant 
admitted his conviction for that crime, but denied this crime (R. 381). 
1
 This case was tried to Judge Pat Brian and ended in a conviction 
approximately two weeks before the trial in this matter. This Court affirmed the 
conviction. See Criddle 1, attached as Addendum. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Sufficiency of the State's case: The evidence from the State's case does 
provides the needed inferences of defendant's guilt. Taking the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the prosecution, a reasonable jury could legitimately 
conclude that defendant's standing between the truck and the trailer while 
Remington was backing up the truck to steal it showed his encouragement and 
aiding of the theft. 
Harmless Error: Because defendant presented evidence on his own behalf 
after the trial court rejected his motion to dismiss, any error the trial court 
allegedly made in that rejection was cured by the defendant's evidence. 
Therefore, even if the trial court should have granted the motion, any error is 
harmless because the jury had sufficient evidence before it to convict. 
Collateral Estoppel: This Court already has ruled on defendant's claim 
that he was mentally incompetent to go to trial. See Criddle 1, attached as 
Addendum. In a memorandum decision from defendant's conviction from the 
second trailer heist, this Court rejected defendant's claim of mental 
incompetency. Because defendant's claim of incompetency is based on the same 
diagnostic and psychological reports in both cases, this Court's decision in 
6 
Criddle I should govern under the doctrine of collateral estoppel or issue 
preclusion. 
Judicial bias: Defendant cannot show plain error in the court's failure to 
sua sponte recuse itself due to alleged judicial bias. Defendant's only claim of 
bias comes from the post-sentencing phase, when the trial judge sent a letter to 
the Board of Pardons and Parole asking to be notified when defendant gained 
parole due to defendant's threats to the court. Defendant cannot establish that 
this constitutes impermissible bias or that the bias, if present then, existed at trial 
or sentencing. 
Restitution: Despite the defendant's timely and clear request for a hearing 
on the amount and imposition of restitution, the trial court failed to hold the 
statutorily-mandated hearing. This ruling was erroneous; therefore, the narrow 




I. WHEN THE STATE'S EVIDENCE IS CONSTRUED IN 
ITS MOST FAVORABLE LIGHT, THERE IS 
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE FROM WHICH THE JURY 
COULD CONCLUDE THAT DEFENDANT 
COMMITTED THEFT; THEREFORE, THE TRIAL 
COURT CORRECTLY REJECTED THE MOTION TO 
DISMISS. 
In his motion to dismiss made at the end of the State's case, defendant 
claimed that the evidence merely showed that defendant was present at the scene 
but did not prove he was actively assisting Remington in taking the trailer (R. 
353). The trial court denied the motion, ruling that there was evidence from 
which the jury could infer defendant was guiding Remington toward the trailer 
(R. 354). That decision was correct and should be affirmed on its merits. 
A motion to dismiss at the close of the State's case is granted only if there 
is insufficient evidence of an element of the charged offense. State v. Taylor, 
884 P.2d 1293, 1296 (Utah App. 1994). The standard is identical to that used in 
general insufficiency claims, but the evidence reviewed is limited to that the State 
presents. Id. If there is "some evidence from which a reasonable jury could find 
that the elements of the crime had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt," the 
motion to dismiss must be rejected. Id; State v. Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221, 1225 
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(Utah 1989). Similarly, both the trial court, and this Court on appeal, looks at 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. Taylor, 884 P.2d at 1296. 
Defendant's motion to dismiss did not challenge the State's having proved 
the theft, i.e., that Remington obtained unauthorized control over Lester 
Gayheart's trailer with the purpose to deprive him of it. Neither does defendant 
challenge the fact that he was standing between the truck and the trailer while 
Remington was backing up his truck (R. 371). Instead, because the State cast 
defendant as an accomplice, it is the State's evidence regarding this finding that 
he calls insufficient.2 
The only question before the trial court was whether there was some 
evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer from defendant's position and 
the other circumstances that he was "encouraging'' or "intentionally aidfing]" the 
theft. Dibello, 780 P.2d 1225. When the trial court declared that "there can be a 
reasonable inference drawn, or an inference drawn which is not unreasonable, 
that the purpose of him [defendant] standing there was to guide the truck to back 
2
 The jury was instructed under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1995) 
that theft occurs when a person "obtains or exercises unauthorized control over 
the property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof" (R. 160). 
Further, the court instructed the jurors of the "aiding and abetting" provision in 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1995) (R. 161). 
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up and pull the trailer away," it expressed an accurate understanding of the 
prevailing rule (R. 354). 
Evaluated in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence shows that 
the trial court correctly applied this rule. At 3:30 in the afternoon, Mr. Schultz 
saw Remington, a stranger, backing up his truck to the trailer (R. 341). 
Defendant, another stranger, was standing in the middle of the three-feet space 
between the truck and trailer (R. 371). Two hours later, Mr. Lindquist saw that 
the trailer was gone and the carport damaged (R. 341). The only reasonable 
inference the jury could draw was that Remington had stolen the trailer and that 
defendant assisted in that enterprise. The evidence which allowed the inference 
to be drawn here is not significantly different in quality or quantity from that the 
Utah Supreme Court upheld in State v. Johnson, 305 P.2d 488 (Utah 1956). 
There, the supreme court upheld the trial court's refusal to grant a motion to 
dismiss, ruling that a reasonable inference could be drawn of Johnson's guilt. 
[Johnson] was present in the vicinity, was seen looking 
in the window when [the principal] was present on the 
inside and then seen walking rapidly around toward the 
rear of the building. From these facts, it is reasonable 
to infer that [Johnson] hid the ladder [which was in the 
rear of the building] and was acting as lookout for [the 
principal]. 
Id. at 489. 
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In contrast, the supreme court reversed in State v. Kalisz, 735 P.2d 60, 61 
(Utah 1987) because it believed the motion to dismiss should have been granted 
due to a paucity of evidence. The Kalisz court castigated the State for failing to 
present evidence showing the defendant at the scene, in the getaway car, or even 
in possession of stolen goods. Kalisz, 735 P.2d at 61. Without this evidence, the 
prosecutor could not make out a prima facie case that Kalisz provided the 
principal with transportation to and from the robbery. Id. 
Unlike Kalisz, here there is evidence from which the jury can infer 
defendant's criminal participation. "Neither juries nor judges are required to 
divorce themselves of common sense, but rather should apply to facts which they 
find proven such reasonable inferences as are justified in the light of their 
experience as to the natural inclinations of human beings." United States v. 
Batista-Polanco, 927 F.2d 14, 18 (1st Cir. 1991). In Batista-Polanco, the 
defendant also claimed he was merely present in a house that happened to be full 
of drugs when police searched and claimed the verdicts were based on 
"speculation and conjecture'' and "guilt by association." Id. Rejecting his "mere 
presence" argument, the appellate court stated that a jury could reasonably infer 
criminal participation because "it runs counter to human experience to suppose 
11 
that criminal conspirators would welcome innocent non-participants as witnesses 
to their crimes." 
Though the jury here would have been within its right to infer that 
defendant was an innocent bystander, in determining the motion to dismiss, the 
trial court was required to draw the inferences in a light most favorable to the 
State. Taylor, 884 P.2d at 1296. That defendant was guiding and assisting 
Remington to guide the truck to the trailer was a reasonable inference. 
H. WHEN HE PRESENTED EVIDENCE IN HIS OWN 
DEFENSE FROM WHICH THE JURY COULD 
INFER GUILT, ANY DEFICIENCIES IN THE 
STATE'S CASE-IN-CHIEF WERE CURED; 
THEREFORE, THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL 
TO GRANT THE MOTION TO DISMISS WAS 
HARMLESS, EVEN IF ERROR. 
Even if this Court rejects the State's argument on the motion to dismiss and 
concludes that the trial court's denial was in error, any error was harmless. In 
State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 784 (Utah 1992), the Utah Supreme Court 
decided that a trial court's erroneous denial of a motion to dismiss should be 
reviewed on the basis of the "record as a whole." This way, the appellate court 
can determine whether the incorrect decision resulted in harmful error; that is, 
whether there is a reasonable likelihood of a different result. Id. Because the 
"record as a whole" is the focus of the reviewing court's "harmless error" 
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analysis, this Court is not bound to look at the evidence with blinders. It can 
consider more evidence than just that presented in the State's case-in-chief, 
including the important testimony from defendant from which the jury could infer 
intent. 
Reviewing a motion to dismiss in the context of all the evidence before the 
jury nicely comports with federal practice on the same issue. There, if a 
defendant makes a judgment for acquittal (analogous to Utah's motion to dismiss) 
at the end of the government's case and that motion is denied, the defendant can 
put on evidence, but loses the right to challenge the sufficiency of the 
prosecution's case. 2 Charles Alan Wright, Federal Practice & Procedure § 
463, at 642-44 (Criminal 1982). On appeal, the court reviews the totality of the 
evidence. Id. 
As the federal courts note, this practice recognizes that, in reality, there 
may be situations where the prosecution fails to make a prima facie case but the 
defendant presents evidence filling the evidentiary gap. United States v. Foster, 
783 F.2d 1082, 1085 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ("a defendant demonstrated to be guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt [should not be] set free merely because, had an earlier 
erroneous ruling been made correctly, the trial would have ended before 
sufficient evidence to convict had been introduced."). 
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The balance between a defendant's procedural rights and the protection of 
society need not be struck in such a fashion that evidence of clear guilt need be 
ignored merely because it came from a defense witness. Id.; United States v. 
Belt, 574 F.2d 1234, 1236-37 (5th Cir. 1978) ("Requiring the defendant to accept 
directly the consequences of [testifying] affirms the adversary process"); State v. 
Simpson, 641 P.2d 320, 325 (Ha. 1982) (reversing after a defendant has 
presented evidence of guilt would be a reversal merely "because of an erroneous 
interlocutory ruling which was cured by subsequent evidence"); see also 
Standards for Criminal Justice § 15-3.8 Commentary at 215 (American Bar 
Assoc. 1983). 
A comparison with this Court's treatment of motions to quash bindover 
orders enlighten this discussion. Recently, this Court and the supreme court have 
commented that any error in refusing to quash a bindover is cured once a 
conviction has been reached. State v. Humphrey, 823 P.2d 464, 467 n.6 (Utah 
1991) (in dicta: "any challenges to the bindover order would be mooted by the 
trial verdict."); State v. Quas, 837 P.2d 565, 566 (Utah App. 1992) ("an error at 
the preliminary stage is cured if the defendant is later convicted beyond a 
reasonable doubt."). The situations addressed in these two cases is practically 
identical with that seen when a defendant presents a case after denial of a motion 
14 
to dismiss: in Humphrey and Quas, the challenged finding of probable cause is 
cured by the later finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; in the motion to 
dismiss, the challenged sufficiency of the State's case is "cured" or rendered 
harmless by the sufficiency of the total evidence. 
A trial court must decide a motion to dismiss expeditiously so that the 
defendant is not forced to present a defense. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 783 (Utah 
1992). However, it is just as important that a defendant not be forced to trial due 
to an incorrect bindover order. Both Humphrey and Quas dispel the notion that 
the importance of this policy compels a review only of the State's preliminary 
hearing case. Similarly, the appellate court should not ignore the reality that the 
defendant testified and that the jury fairly may have deduced his guilt from that 
testimony as well as the State's.3 
3
 Apparently recognizing that the defendant's case provided any 
evidence needed to meet the "beyond a reasonable doubt" burden," defendant 
does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence as a whole. 
15 
HI. DEFENDANT IS PRECLUDED FROM CLAIMING 
THAT HE WAS INCOMPETENT DURING TRIAL 
ON THE BASIS OF THIS COURT'S 
MEMORANDUM DECISION IN HIS APPEAL 
FROM HIS FIRST CONVICTION. 
On September 6, 1996, this Court issued a memorandum decision in State 
v. Criddle, No. 950639-CA (Utah App. Sep. 6, 1996) (unpublished memorandum 
decision) ("Criddle I").4 That decision arose from the second trailer heist, which 
occurred on April 23, the day after the crime here at issue. The trials were held 
before different judges5 and were approximately two weeks apart, with the 
second trailer heist going first. In that appeal, defendant claimed that his counsel 
was ineffective for failing to request the trial judge's recusal and a trial 
competency hearing. He makes those same challenges in this case. Brief of 
Defendant at 17, 25. 
The doctrine of collateral estoppel, also called issue preclusion, applies and 
prevents defendant from relitigating the issues this Court already has decided. 
Sevy v. Security Title Co., 902 P.2d 629, 632 (Utah 1995). Collateral estoppel is 
4
 Court rules generally prohibit citation to unpublished decisions 
except when needed for the purposes of "the doctrine of the law of the case, res 
judicata, or collateral estoppel." Utah Code Jud.Admin. R. 4-605 (1996). 
5
 Judge Anne M. Stirba presided over this case; Judge Pat B. Brian 
presided over the other trial. 
16 
appropriate when (1) the issue decided in the prior adjudication is identical to the 
issue presented in the pending case; (2) there was a final judgment on the merits 
in the prior case; (3) the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was 
the party in the prior case; and (4) the issue in the first case was "completely, 
fully, and fairly litigated." Id.; Glick v. Holden, 889 P.2d 1389, 1391 (Utah 
App. 1995). Defendant's assertions of mental incompetency meets those factors. 
As he did in Criddle I, defendant asserts that his behavior in court and his 
90-day diagnostic evaluation would have led a reasonably prudent attorney to 
request a competency hearing. Brief of Defendant at 24. In support of this 
claim, defendant looks to his "odd" behavior in court and comments in his 90-
day evaluation that stated he has a schizotypal personality disorder with paranoid 
features. Id.; Diagnostic Evaluation Report and Psychological Evaluation at 3. 
The same diagnostic evaluation was prepared for both sentencing proceedings and 
was before this Court in Criddle I. Id. at 1. That memorandum decision stated 
that "the ninety-day diagnostic report does not support the proposition that 
Criddle was not competent to stand trial at the time of trial." Criddle, at 2 
(Addendum). 
Defendant's purportedly "odd" behavior, while accurately characterized, 
does not indicate incompetence. More importantly, it is not as "odd" or 
17 
"bizarre" as his behavior in Criddle I. Here, defendant's actions consisted of 
insisting on testifying on his own behalf, repeatedly interrupting the trial judge, 
and spitting on the courtroom door (R. 199, 227; Brief of Defendant at 20). 
Compared with Criddle I, where defendant made a shooting gesture at the judge's 
head and persistently sent vaguely threatening letters to the judge, those activities 
are minor.6 Because this Court already has held in Criddle I that the more 
egregious behavior there did not indicate incompetence, defendant should be 
precluded from re-litigating this issue. 
6
 Defendant cites no support for the implicit and novel proposition that 
insisting on a right to testify evidences mental incompetence. Also, his 
interrupting the judge and spitting on the door could just as easily indicate anger 
and hostility toward authority than mental incompetence. Both a reasonably 
prudent attorney and a reasonably prudent trial court could interpret these actions 
in that manner. 
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IV. DEFENDANT CANNOT ESTABLISH THAT THE TRIAL 
JUDGE WAS ACTUALLY BIASED; THEREFORE, THE 
CONVICTION IS NOT REVERSIBLE ON THE 
GROUND THAT THE JUDGE SHOULD HAVE 
RECUSED HERSELF. 
Defendant also challenges his conviction on the basis that the judge was 
biased and, therefore, should have disqualified herself. He made the same claim 
in Criddle I, which actually presented stronger support for the argument. 
Nevertheless, this Court concluded that the judge's failure to recuse himself was 
not an obvious error. (Addendum). Here, the only evidence defendant points to 
as an indication of bias is a letter the judge sent the Board of Pardons and Parole 
after sentencing requesting that she be notified of defendant's release. From this, 
defendant infers that the "threatening" letters he sent the judge must have caused 
her to become biased (R. 198-99). Brief of Defendant at 28. The letter to 
which defendant refers is a calm and factual letter that explains to the Board how 
defendant "shouted" at the Court, "spat" on her door, and "personalized" the 
judge by calling her by her first name (R. 198). It also indicates that one letter 
made threatening comments (id.). They provide no indication that defendant's 
comments so rattled or angered the judge that she would have acted improperly 
against defendant. Defendant also does not explain how the Board of Pardons 
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letter showed that the judge had formed an improper bias against him during trial 
and sentencing. 
To date, no Utah case has looked at a potential for judicial bias where a 
defendant has made threats, however vague, to a judge. In two similar cases 
from Colorado and Indiana, however, the state supreme courts ruled that a 
defendant's threats did not require disqualification. At one extreme, the 
Colorado Supreme Court declared that even the trial judge's statement that he 
believed a criminal's threats to shoot him did not mandate recusal. Smith v. 
District Court for the Fourth Jud. District, 629 P.2d 1055, 1059 (Colo. 1981). 
Significantly, the appellate court noted that the trial already had occurred and 
only sentencing remained: "The judge's comments did not show prejudice against 
the defendant, but rather evidenced his interpretation of the defendant's 
propensity for violence based upon information learned in the course of judicial 
proceedings. The defendant's propensity for violence is a factor which the judge 
was entitled to consider in imposing sentence." Id. 
The Colorado court also explained that good policy reasons supported its 
determination not to require recusal on the basis of a defendant's threats. "To 
allow threats toward a judge to cause compulsory recusal would enable a 
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defendant to use vulgarity and threats to disqualify every judge that did not 
measure up to his own particular specifications or requirements." Id. 
The Indiana Supreme Court has ruled that a trial judge's published 
comments that he was "mad" and "concerned" about a defendant's threats did 
not establish "such prejudice ... as to deprive him of the right to be tried before 
an impartial judge." Yager v. State, 437 N.E.2d 454, 462 (Ind. 1982). In so 
ruling, the court observed: "At best the remarks attributed to the judge reflect the 
frustrations he must have felt in dealing with an extremely uncooperative 
defendant who had made thinly veiled threats against the judge and other ... 
officials." Id. 
Because the only "evidence," if any, of bias occurred after the trial and 
sentencing, defendant cannot logically show an obvious error in the trial court's 
not disqualifying itself during the trial or the sentencing. Therefore, this claim 
should be rejected. 
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V. BECAUSE DEFENDANT OBJECTED TO THE 
AMOUNT OF RESTITUTION, THE TRIAL 
COURT SHOULD HAVE HELD A FULL 
HEARING AND GIVEN HEM A CHANCE TO 
DISPROVE THE AMOUNT OWED; THEREFORE, 
THIS MATTER NEEDS TO BE REMANDED FOR 
A RESTITUTION HEARING. 
At the sentencing hearing, defendant's counsel requested a hearing on the 
amount of restitution because of concern about the accuracy of the amount and 
confusion between the two trailer cases (R. 225-26). Despite this request, the 
trial court ordered restitution in the amount of $4745 and stated that the Board of 
Pardons and Parole could hold a hearing to reduce it if needed (R. 228). 
Although the parole board has the constitutional and statutory power to reduce 
restitution, a hearing before that agency cannot substitute for a mandatory court 
hearing. Utah Const, art. VII, § 12 (1995); Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-6 (Supp. 
1996). Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-20l(4)(e) (Supp. 1996) obligates the court to 
hold a hearing if the defendant objects to the "imposition, amount, or distribution 
of the restitution." State v. Starnes, 841 P.2d 712, 715 (Utah App. 1992) 
("[Defendant statutorily entitled to 'full hearing' on the question of 
restitution."). Because the trial court did not give defendant a hearing, the 
question of the amount and imposition of restitution should be remanded. 
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CONCLUSION 
Defendant's conviction for theft should be affirmed. The order imposing 
restitution should be vacated and the issue remanded to the trial court for a full 
hearing pursuant to section 76-3-20l(4)(e). 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS JjLday of November 1996. 
JAN GRAHAM 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
JAMES H. BEADLES 
Assistant Attorney General 
Criminal Appeals Division 
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ADDENDUM 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Bret Thomas Criddle, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
FILED 
SEP 0 6 1996 
COURT OF APPEALS 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Official Publication) 
Case No. 950639-CA 
F I L E D 
(September 6, 1996) 
Third District, Salt Lake Department, Division II 
The Honorable Pat B. Brian 
Attorneys: Candice A. Johnson, Salt Lake City, for Appellant 
Jan Graham and James Beadles, Salt Lake City, for 
Appellee 
Before Judges Greenwood, Jackson, and Wilkins. 
WILKINS, Judge: 
Criddle raises two issues on appeal. The first issue 
involves whether the trial judge should have recused himself due 
to bias against Criddle, caused by Criddlefs actions, and whether 
his lawyer's failure to move for recusal constitutes ineffective 
assistance of counsel. 
Because Criddle never filed a motion for disqualification 
under Rule 29 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, he must 
now show that the trial judge's failure to unilaterally recuse 
himself was plain error. Sfifi State v. Menzies. 889 P.2d 393, 403 
(Utah 1994), egrt. denied. 115 S. Ct. 910 (1995). Criddle has 
failed to meet the plain error standard. £££ id. No evidence of 
any kind appears, nor was any noted by Criddle, suggesting bias 
on the part of the trial judge prior to or during the course of 
the trial. For example, regarding Criddle1s apology for the 
threatening gesture he made in court, the trial judge stated he 
did not dispute that it was heartfelt. Criddle has not shown the 
judge's failure to recuse himself was an obvious error, 
constituting plain error. £££ id. Therefore, his claim fails. 
We also reject Criddle1s claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel. To support this claim, Criddle must show his counsel's 
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness 
and that the deficient performance prejudiced the result. See 
State v. PgrT~y. 899 P.2d 1232, 1239 (Utah App. 1995). Because we 
hold Criddle has failed to show the trial judge was biased, we 
also reject this claim. 
The second issue Criddle raises is whether he should not 
have been tried because at the time of trial he was not 
sufficiently competent to stand trial. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-
15-1 & -2 (1995). As with Criddle's claim of judicial bias, 
because his competency was not raised at trial, Criddle must show 
plain error or ineffective assistance of counsel. Our 
examination of the record, however, reveals no indication of a 
lack of competency on Criddle1s part at the time of trial. In 
addition, the ninety-day diagnostic report does not support the 
proposition that Criddle was not competent to stand trial at the 
time of trial. 
Affirmed. 
Michael J. Wilkins, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
^ 7T £&***. 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
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